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CASENOTES AND COMMENTS
which had been created by the General Assembly in 1929,124
began its work by procuring changes in the laws affecting
the adlministration of personalty in the Orphans' Court.
The Commission proposes to continue its efforts in this
respect by procuring an entire statutory revision of testamentary law and procedure.

CANCELLATION OF ACCRUED DIVIDENDS ON
PREFERRED STOCK UNDER GENERAL RESERVATION IN CHARTER OF POWER TO MAKE
AMENDMENTS CHANGING TERMS OF
OUTSTANDING STOCK
Of especial interest to corporation counsel in recent
years has been the question whether a scheme for capital
adjustment may include the cancellation of accrued dividends on preferred stock. Under the Maryland statute
such a change requires unanimous consent of the holders
of the preferred issue affected unless the charter contains
an appropriate reservation of the amending power.' The
larger Maryland corporations in many, if not most, cases
operate under charters which contain express reservations
of amending power. A typical form of clause is as follows:
"The corporation reserves the right to make any amendment authorized by law, including amendments changing
the terms of outstanding stock, provided that any such
amendment shall require the vote of the holders of twothirds of the stock affected thereby."'
This typical situation in Maryland may be contrasted
with the similar one in Delaware. Such reservations are
seldom found in Delaware charters. The reason is that
since 1915 the Delaware law has contained a provision that
an amendment altering or changing the "preferences" of
preferred stock may be made, provided holders of a majority of the stock affected vote in favor of the change.' The
12'

Acbs, 1929, Ch. 527.

1 Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 28.
2Frequently
the charter, in place of requiring consent of a majority or
two-thirds of the stock affected, merely specifies the vote required by law
for amendments not changing outstanding stock. Such vote is two-thirds
of each class of voting stock. Art. 23, Sec. 29. But under another section
the charter may specify that any action may be taken by a majority of
each class, or by a majority of nll votes to which the shares of all classes
of voting stock are, in the aggregate, entitled. Art. 23, Sec. 23.
' Del. Rev. Code 1915, Sec. 1940; Del. Laws, Vol. 29, Ch. 113, Sec. 12.
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statutory provision was "read into" the charter," and it
was thought that the language was broad enough to include
any desired change in the rights of preferred stock. The
Chancellor held, however, that the statute did not permit
cancellation of accrued dividends, although the right to
preferential dividends accruing after amendment might be
taken away by such amendment.' The statute was then revised to permit, by the same vote, amendments changing
the "preferences, or relative, participating, optional, or
other special rights of the shares." ' The phrase "special
rights" had been relied on in an English case, cited by the
Delaware Chancellor, which had permitted cancellation of
accrued dividends by an "extraordinary resolution", under
a reservation in the Articles of power to change special
rights of stockholders.7 This Delaware amendment was
adopted in 1927. In November, 1936, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the language used in the amended
statute was not broad enough to include cancellation of accrued dividends, and, if so interpreted, its application to
dividends accrued on stock issued prior to 1927 would be
unconstitutional.' Reargument was denied on February
19, 1937. 9
The United States District Court in Rhode Island had
previously held that a Delaware corporation, organized before 1927, could not take advantage of the 1927 statute so
as to cancel accrued dividends which were covered by existing surplus.1" This distinction between accrued dividends covered by existing surplus and those not so covered
has not been approved by the Delaware courts.1 1
As a result of the recent Delaware decision several corporations chartered in that state have abandoned plans for
readjustment of their capital structure which included cancellation of accrued dividends. 2 On the other hand several
' Peters v. United States Mortgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. Rep. 11, 114 Atl. 598
(1921); Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. Rep 136, 122
Ati. 696 (1923).
5Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., supra.
6Del. Laws, Vol. 35, Ch. 85, See. 10.
ILast v. Butler & Co., Ltd., (1919) Ch. Div. 36. And see In re Welsbach
Incandescent Gas Light Co., Ltd., (1904) 1 Ch. 87.
8 Keller v. Wilson & Co., (Del. Sup. Ct. 1936), Prentice-Hall Corp. Serv.,
Par. 20, 677; reversing 180 Atl. 584 (Del. Ch. 1935).
9 Prentice-Hall Corp. Serv., Par. 20, 728. The decision has been approved
in (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 620; (1937) 23 Va. L. Rev. 579.
10Yoakam v. Providence Bltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 533 (D. C. R. I.

1929).

See opinion of Del. Sup. Ct. in Keller v. Wilson & Co., aapr, note 8.
"Prentice-Hall Corp. Serv., Par. 20, 678.
11
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Maryland corporations have announced that they are going
forward with similar plans.
Pertinent parts of the Maryland statute are as follows:
"Every corporation of this State ... may...
amend its charter and thereby accomplish any one or
more of the following objects: . .. the classification or
reclassification of all or any part of the capital stock;
and the making of any other amendment that may be
desired provided that such amendment shall contain
only such provisions as it would be lawful or proper to
insert in an original certificate of incorporation made
at the time of making such amendment." 8
Since the new capital stock provisions can be so worded
as to "contain only such provisions as it would be lawful
or proper to insert in an original certificate", avoiding
mention of the right to accrued dividends under the previous wording of the charter, the broad power to make "any
. . . amendment that may be desired" seems to cover the
cancellation of accrued dividends. Under the power to reclassify, the Articles of Amendment, it may be assumed,
would contain an additional clause transforming the old
cumulative dividend stock into the new stock. While the
power to reclassify might not be sufficient by itself, 4 it may
" Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 28, last amended by Acts, 1922, Ch. 309. An
extended history of the amending provisions of the Maryland corporation
statute appears in Brune, Maryland Corporation Law, 76-82, Sec. 63.
"I See Breslav v. New York & Queens El. Lt. & P. Co., 291 N. Y. S. 932,
decided by the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, December 4, 1936, Prentice-Hall Corp. Serv., Par. 20, 697, N. Y. Law Journal,
December 14, 1936, affirmed without opinion by N. Y. Ct. of Apps. March 16,
1937. The Breslav case, holding that the power to classify and reclassify
shares did not authorize an amendment making non-callable stock callable,
contains a comprehensive review of the cases on valid and invalid exercise
of a general reserved power to amend. Examples given of valid ezercis6:
Lord v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. . 443 (1909)
(mutualization of stock insurance company by enfranchisement of all
policyholders) ; Looker v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46 (1900) (cumulative voting for directors) ; Miller v. The State, 15 Wall. 478 (1873) (change in
voting rights); Hinckley v. Schwarzschild & S. Co., 107 App. Div. 470, 95
N. Y. Supp. 357 (1905) (authorizing issuance of preferred stock) ; Somerville v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 46 Mont. 268, 127 Pac. 464 (1912)
(authorizing majority of stockholders to assess holders of full-paid stock) ;
Randle v. Winona Coal Co., 206 Ala. 254, 89 So. 790 (1921) (authorizing
conversion of par value stock into stock of no par value) ; Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 AtI. 654 (1928) (authorizing
the majority of the stockholders of all classes to withdraw the right to
retire Class A stock and, after certain dividends had been paid on Class A
and Class B stocks, to abolish Class B's superior Interest In the sharing
of further dividends by equalizing the stock of both classes) ; Gardner v.
Hope Ins., 9 R. I. 194 (1869) (non-assessable stock made assessable);
Venner v. U. S. Steel Corp., 116 Fed. 1012 (1902) (change in rates of
dividends). Examples of invalid exercise: Lord v. Equitable Life Assur.
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be invoked to sustain the procedural directions for issuance
of the new stock in place of the old.
As previously indicated, amendments "changing the
terms of outstanding stock", require unanimous consent of
that stock in the absence of a charter reservation. The
statutory provision is as follows:
"No amendment of the charter of a corporation
shall be valid which changes the terms of any of the
outstanding stock by classification, reclassification or
otherwise, in the absence of a reservation in the charter of the right to make such amendment, unless such
change in the terms thereof shall have been authorized
by the holders of all of such stock at the time outstanding, by vote at a meeting or in writing with or without
a meeting; and in the case of any such change of terms
of outstanding stock, the articles of amendment shall,
in addition, to other matters required by law, affirmatively set forth that the holders of such stock have duly
authorized such change of terms. The word 'terms'
as used in this section in reference to stock is intended
to mean only the contract rights of the holders thereof
as expressed in the charter and shall be so construed. "15
Soc., supra (deprivation of right to vote for all directors; reason: right
to vote is "vested") ; Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 285, 78
N. E. 1090 (1906) and Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & R. Co., 253 N. Y. 274,
170 N. E. 917 (1930) (deprivation of pre-emptive right; reason: preemptive right is an "inherent" right) ; Page v. American & British Manufacturing Co., 129 App. Div. 346, 113 N. Y. Supp. 734 (1908) (reduction of
voting power by reduction of stock; reason: right to vote Is "vested");
Yoakum v. Providence Biltmore Hotel Co., 34 F. (2d) 535 (D. C. R. I. 1929)
(elimination of sinking fund and dividend arrearages; reason: impairment of "vested" rights) ; Sutton v. Globe Knitting Works, 276 Mich. 200,
267 N. W. 815 (1936) and Vanden Bosch v. Michigan Trust Co., 35 F. (2d)
643 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929) (postponement of redemption date; reason: impairment of "vested" rights); Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497,
91 P. 369 (1907) (making non-assessable stocks assessable; reason: impairment of obligation of contract) ; Coombes v. Getz, 285 U. S. 434 (1932)
(repeal of statutory liability of directors to creditors for money embezzled
by officers; reason: impairment of "vested" rights); Roberts v. RobertsWicks Co., 184 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (1906) (elimination of dividend arrearages; reason.: impairment of "vested" rights) ; General Investment Co.
v. American Hide & Leather Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 AtI. 244 (1925)
(elimination of dividend arrearages; reason: impairment of "vested"
rights); Lonsdale v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 101 N. J. Eq.
534, 139 At. 50 (1927) (elimination of dividend arrearages; reason: impairment of "vested" rights): Pronlk v. Spirits Distributing Co., 38 N. J.
Eq. 97, 42 AtI. 586 (1899) (reduction of dividend rate; reason: impairment
of "vested" rights).
See also for other illustrations of the extension of and limitations upon
the reserved power in (1927) 75 Univ. of Pa. Law Review 725; (1930) 43
Harvard Law Review 656; (1929) 20 Columbia Law Review 88; (1928) 14
Cornell
Law Quarterly 85; and 105 A. L. R. 1452.
1
Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 28.
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The "reservation in the charter of the right to make
such amendment" excepts a corporation from the requirement of obtaining a vote of the stock affected (if non-voting
stock), unless the charter itself so requires. Moreover, the
language of this portion of the statute lends strong support to the view that any amendment changing the terms of
outstanding stock may be made under a charter reservation."0 The right of a preferred stockholder to accumulated
unpaid dividends is called by the Delaware Court a "vested
right", a "right in the nature of a debt", rights that "accrue to them (stockholders) by virtue of the contract." ' T
Consideration of the nature of the right, and these characterizations of it, place it among the "contract, rights of
the stockholders as expressed in the charter", which is the
Maryland statutory definition of the "terms of outstanding
stock." 18 If, under the statute, these contract rights cannot be changed except with unanimous consent of the
holders, in the absence of a charter reservation, is it not
clear that the existence of the reservation permits the
change by such vote as the charter may specify?
Other considerations, beyond the scope of this note, may
enter into the situation. The reservation itself must be
appropriately worded. Doubt may be expressed whether a
reservation which does not specify the vote required for
an amendment changing outstanding stock may safely be
relied upon. 19 Moreover, in all cases in which rights of
1oUnless affirmative force is given to this language, the requirement of
unanimous consent, in the absence of a reservation, seems meaningless. It
may be argued that affirmative force can be accorded the provision with
respect to changes in future dividends, future relative preferences, or
future voting rights without authorizing cancellation of dividend arrearages. This assumes, however, that the clause requiring unanimous consent
for certain amendments is broader In scope than the reservation in that
clause. Such a conclusion would seem to require a distortion of the words
used, for, taken literally, the language requiring unanimous consent is inoperative when the charter contains an appropriate reservation. Hence
the reference to a charter reservation may be expected to furnish a controlling consideration, either through its own affirmative force or through
influencing a broad rather than narrow interpretation of the general power
of amendment previously referred to. The question is purely one of statutory construction, as there are no Maryland cases sufficiently near the point
to be of assistance on either side of the argument.
17Keller v. Wilson & Co., supra, note 8. Whether these rights are
"vested" would seem to depend upon whether Section 28 authorizes them
to be taken away without unanimous consent of the holders thereof, by
such vote as is specified in the charter. Use of the term "vested rights",
therefore, adds nothing to the force of the stockholder's contention, as it is
an argument from the conclusion-it begs the question. If Section 28
authorizes dividend arrearages to be cancelled, the right to such dividends
can be vested only In a defeasible sense.
28
Md. Code, Art. 23, Sec. 28.
1
9Cf. Brune, Maryland Corporation Law, p. 75, note 53.
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stockholders are readjusted, by amendment, consolidation
or otherwise, to the advantage of a controlling group or
class, it is believed that a court of equity may inquire into
the fairness of the proposed change and whether it serves
the interests of the corporation as a whole.20 Clearly, if
the unfairness of the plan is so gross and apparent as to
constitute fraud, the courts will interfere in spite of the
adoption of the plan in strict accordance with statutory and
charter provisions."

EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE ON REVOCATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATOR'S
LICENSE FOR FAILURE TO SATISFY JUDGMENT. ELLIS V. RUDY, COMMISSIONER.1
The petitioner-appellant's license to operate a motor
vehicle in the State of Maryland was suspended by the appellee-Commissioner of Motor Vehicles because he failed
"to satisfy a final judgment against him for damages on
account of personal injury resulting from the ownership,
maintenance, use or operation of a motor vehicle," within
30 days after it became final, as required by the Maryland
Financial Responsibility Law. Later the petitioner was
adjudicated a bankrupt and was granted a discharge in
bankruptcy. This was admittedly a defense to any further action on the judgment. Petitioner applied for reissue
of his license on furnishing proof of financial responsibility.
The Commissioner refused on the ground that the statute
requires the license to remain suspended while the judgment is "unstayed, unsatisfied and subsisting and until" it
"is satisfied or discharged and until proof of ability to respond in damages for future accidents is furnished" and
held that a discharge in bankruptcy is not a satisfaction of
the judgment within the contemplation of the Act. The
petitioner brought a proceeding for a writ of mandamus
to compel the reissue of the license. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the petition and petitioner appealed.
HELD: Reversed and remanded for issuance of writ.
See authorities cited Brune, op cit., p. 82.
*1See Homer v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 155 Md. 66, 88, 141 Atl. 425
(1928) ; Mortgage Bond Assn. v. Baker, 157 Md. 809, 145 Atl. 876 (1929);
Hagerstown Furniture Co. v. Baker, 155 Md. 549, 142 Atl. 885 (1928).
20

2- Md. -, 189 AtI. 281 (1937).
$Md. Code Supp., Art. 56, Sees. 187 to 18TR, Inel.

